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Today's shortage of financial resources calls for the attention of researchers to the problem 
of financial constraints faced by firms. In this paper we analyse firms' financial constraints 
by estimating both investment-cash flow sensitivities and cash-cash flow sensitivities upon 
a  large  unbalanced  panel  of  Portuguese  firms  in  order  to  obtain  robust  findings. 
Additionally, we classify firms according to characteristics that are generally believed to 
indicate the presence of constraints (size, age and dividend payment). Our results clearly 
show that Portuguese firms are, in general, financially constrained. Furthermore, we verify 
that such constraints are more severe for certain groups of firms, in particular those firms 
that are smaller and do not pay dividends. However, we do not find evidence that age as a 
good  proxy  for  financial  constraints.  Finally,  we  cast  some  doubts  on  the  direct 
implementation of the SA index as a measure of financial constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis, the severest since 1920's Great Depression, has showed that the 
study of the impact of financial constraints upon firm dynamics needs further attention of 
researchers. In fact, despite economic theory provides some insights on  the causes and 
effects  of  financial  constraints,  empirical  literature  has  struggled  to  find  consistent 
measures of these constraints. Firms have both internal and external forms of financing 
their operational and investment activities. Even if we abstain from thinking in terms of 
opportunity  costs,  obtaining  funds  externally  requires  a  premium  to  be  paid,  which  is 
associated with the risk that external investors have to bear when they decide to lend. Thus, 
the existence of information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 
1984) sets a wedge between the costs of internal and external sources of finance, creating a 
financial hierarchy and aggravating the constraints faced by firms. 
  The purpose of this paper is threefold: (a) identify and measure the level of financial 
distress faced by firms; (b) identify the group(s) of firms that suffer the most with financial 
constraints  by  distinguishing  them  according  to  their  characteristics;  (c)  evaluate  and 
compare the validity and accuracy of the measures that are usually employed to analyse 
financial constraints. To accomplish this task, we proceed in two steps. First we perform an 
a priori classification of firms into financially constrained and unconstrained based on their 
characteristics and financial information available from our dataset. Second, we estimate 
two  empirical  models  from  different  approaches,  in  order  evaluate  the  level  of  such 
constraints across groups of firms. The use of different approaches will also allow us to 
draw conclusions on the consistency, advantages and disadvantages of such methodologies. 
To conduct our empirical test we use an unbalanced panel of Portuguese firms covering the 
period 1996-2004. 3 
 
  Making use of investment literature, we will resort to an investment accelerator 
model,  within  Bond  et  al.  (2003)  framework,  in  order  to  estimate  the  sensitivity  of 
investment to cash-flow (hereafter ICFS), the traditional measure of financial constraints. 
Meanwhile, we borrow some insights from recent literature on liquidity demand to estimate 
the sensitivity of cash stocks to cash-flow (hereafter CCFS), a relatively new approach to 
measure financial constraints proposed by Almeida et al. (2004). Additionally, we will also 
be able to evaluate the interesting Size and Age index (hereafter SA index) of financial 
constraints suggested by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Our results, while supporting previous 
literature on the inverse relationship between size, dividend policy and financial constraints, 
they cast some doubts on previously devised relationships between age and the level of 
constraints. Finally, we raise some doubts on the direct use of the SA index to sort firms 
according to their constraints. 
  This paper is rather original in the sense that: (a) it explores a recent methodology to 
measure financial constraints (CCFS) that, although appearing useful and consistent, to our 
knowledge has barely been used yet; (b) it tests a new way of classifying firms by their 
level of financial distress (SA index), that, as far as we know, has not yet been used except 
in its introductory paper (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010); (c) it is the first to explore this dataset 
to  analyse  financial  constraints  for  the  Portuguese  economy—only  a  few  works  have 
investigated financial constraints in Portugal, but with different datasets and methodologies 
(see Cabral and Mata, 2003 or Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006). 
  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  will  overview  and  summarize  the 
existent literature on financial constraints. In Section 3 we will discuss the dataset and 
variables used. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology followed, while Section 5 
presents the main results. Finally, Section 6 pulls the pieces together and concludes.  
 4 
 
2. Measuring financial constraints 
Financial constraints is a rather abstract concept since it cannot be directly observable. In 
fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a clear-cut definition. As a starting point, in the 
spirit of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we can apply a precise, but broader definition by 
stating that financial constraints are present whenever there is a wedge between the costs of 
obtaining internal and external funds. The problem with such definition is that it virtually 
covers every firm. As an alternative, we prefer to define financial constraint as the inability 
of  a  firm  to  raise  the  necessary  amounts  (usually  due  to  external  finance  shortage)  to 
finance their investment and growth. Perhaps due to this abstract nature of the concept, 
there is no clear methodology to determine financial constraints. Many researchers still 
devote  their  time  in  trying  to  find  a  method  to  identify  and  quantify  this  directly 
unobservable relationship. However, such measures are built on fragile relationships and 
proxies for financial constraints. 
  Considerable debate surrounds the best measure to use in the analysis of financial 
constraints. Since the seminal work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) (hereafter 
FHP),  that  introduced  Investment-Cash  Flow  Sensitivities  as  way  to  measure  such 
constraints,  several  researchers  have  tried  to  develop  consistent  measures  of  financial 
constraints. The rationale used consisted in classifying firms a priori as constrained and 
unconstrained, based on their dividend policy. By assuming that constrained firms, in order 
to finance their investment, ―retain all of the low-cost internal funds they can generate‖ and 
so pay lower dividends, FHP proceed to the estimation of ICFS for each class of firms. 
They regress investment on cash-flow, estimated Q (control for investment opportunities) 
and year and firm dummies upon a sample consisting of 422 USA firms (1970-1984). Their 
findings, that low-dividend firms exhibit higher ICFS than high-dividend ones, suggested 5 
 
that low-dividend firms, by investing more of their extra cash-flows, are more financially 
constrained. 
  Despite that most empirical studies build on this relationship, subsequent literature 
has  pointed  three  main  critiques.  The  first  arguments  against  this  measure  come  from 
Kaplan  and  Zingales  (1997)  (hereafter  KZ).  They  point  out  that,  not  only  certain 
assumptions made on the curvature of the cost function of external finance were not met, 
but  also  that  the  classification  scheme  used  by  FHP  was  flawed.  In  particular,  due  to 
precautionary savings and potentially risky adverse management, the dividend policy is an 
inaccurate sorting variable. As an alternative they focus their classification on qualitative 
information from firms’ financial statements.  
  The second main critique, concerns problems associated with using Q as a proxy for 
investment  opportunities.  First,  it  is  impossible  to  measure  marginal  Q  and  thus  the 
empirical  approximation  (average  Q;  see  Hayashi,  1981)  entails  potential 
missmeasurements  due  to  the  violation  of  certain  assumptions,  such  as  imperfect 
competition and the relationship between firms’ investment and financial decisions in these 
particular  types  of  models  (see  Chirinko,  1993,  and  Hubbard,  1998,  for  a  discussion). 
Second,  Cash-Flow  might  itself  contain  information  about  investment  opportunities, 
particularly for firms that face high uncertainty about their investment projects (usually 
young and growth firms), so cash flow might indicate the direction to go by revealing 
additional information on the projects’ quality. As a result, one should expect that part of 
the ICFS is due to investment opportunities that were not captured by Q. In fact, Alti 
(2003), in a financially frictionless model, shows that even after Q correction firms still 
present significant ICFS. 
  Finally, several authors such as Povel and Raith (2002), Cleary et al. (2007) or 
Lyandres (2007) found the ICFS relationship to be non-monotonic. They argue that ICFS 6 
 
are U-shaped with respect to constraints due to the risk associated with firm default and the 
efforts of investors in trying to avoid such liquidation losses—by providing larger amounts 
to mitigate the risk of default—, for sufficiently low levels of internal funds. In this case, a 
decrease in internal funds below a certain threshold would imply an increase in investment. 
Overall, these critiques  cast serious doubts on the robustness of ICFS as a measure  of 
financial constraints. 
  As an alternative to ICFS, some researchers derive a reduced form Euler equation 
from a structural model and check if parameter restrictions are met. If not, then, for a 
certain sample there is evidence for the presence of constraints (e.g. Whited, 1992, Harhoff, 
1998). However, this methodology does not allow to measure the degree t which firms are 
financially constrained, therefore we will abstain from using it. 
  Recently, analyzing firm’s demand for cash, Almeida et al. (2004) advance that the 
level of financial constraints can be measured by the sensitivity of cash stock to cash flow. 
They argue that only constrained firms will manage liquidity to maximize their value. The 
rationale behind is that while constrained firms need to save cash out of cash flows in order 
to take advantage of future investment opportunities, unconstrained firms do not, as they 
are able to resort to external finance. Meanwhile, firms that hold cash incur in opportunity 
costs associated with present investment opportunities. As a result, only constrained firms 
will need to optimize their cash stocks over time, in order to maximize their profits and 
hedge future shocks. Therefore, one can expect that estimates on the sensitivity of cash 
stocks to cash-flow would be positive and significant for constrained firms, while no such 
relation should be expected for unconstrained ones.  
  To our knowledge, only a few works have used this approach so far. Specifically, 
Han and Qiu (2006) for US publicly traded companies from 1997 to 2002, corroborate this 
finding. However other recent works do not support this view. Pál and Ferrando (2009) 7 
 
found that, for Euro-area firms between 1994 and 2003, all firms presented positive and 
significant CCFS. Meanwhile, Lin (2007), for publicly traded Taiwanese firms between 
1990 and 2004, also finds that, contrary to Almeida et al. (2004), both constrained and 
unconstrained firms present significant CCFS but, as expected, such sensitivity is higher for 
constrained firms. Finally, while some authors find that financial development alleviates 
financial constraints—see Carreira and Silva (2009) for a survey—, Khurana et al. (2005), 
analyzing firm-level data for 35 countries between 1994-2002, find that there is a negative 
association between financial development and CCFS providing further evidence that this 
methodology is a useful measure of firm’s financial constraints. 
  With respect to classification schemes, several authors point out different variables 
that can be used to sort and distinguish firms according to a level of financial distress. 
Examples of these are (a) dividend payout ratio; (b) firm self evaluation; (c) cash stocks; (d) 
degree  of  leverage;  (e)  age;  (f)  size;  (g)  institutional  affiliation;  (h)  credit  ratings  (see 
Carreira and Silva, 2009). 
  Also  building  on  previous  relations  found  in  empirical  literature,  indexes  of 
financial  constraints  have  been  advanced.  Examples  can  be  found  in  the  KZ  index  of 
Lamont et al. (2001), the WW index of Whited and Wu (2006) and the index proposed by 
Musso  and  Schiavo  (2008).  In  particular,  the  SA  (Size  and  Age)  index  proposed  by 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) seems to be appealing since it draws on two variables that are 
―more  exogenous‖  than  the  ones  typically  used.  Additionally,  not  only  it  allows  for  a 
quadratic  (thus  non-monotonic)  relationship  to  constraints,  but  it  is  also  of  simple 
implementation. 
  In  this  paper  we  will  use  different  measures  proposed  by  previous  empirical 
literature in an attempt to consistently distinguish financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms while assessing the severity of such constraints. It is clear that no consistent measure 8 
 
of  financial  constraints  has  yet  been  developed  and  the  difficulty  associated  with  the 
abstract concept of financial makes it harder to find such a perfect measure. Keeping this 
caveat  in  mind,  we  attempt  to  clarify  the  financing  problems  of  Portuguese  firms  and 
compare  different  approaches  to  measure  constraints.  Inferences  using  this  sample, 
representative of Portuguese firms, may be made with respect to, at least, the EU economy 
(cf. Cabral, 2007). However, some specific characteristics of the Portuguese economy must 
be  taken  into  account.  In  particular,  if  indeed  firms  in  economies  with  less  developed 
financial markets suffer from more severe financial constraints, then, with respect to, for 




In  order  to  investigate  the  financial  constraints  faced  by  Portuguese  firms  we  borrow 
insights from two different approaches: (a) investment demand based on an investment 
accelerator  model;  (b)  liquidity  demand,  modelling  cash  holdings  as  a  function  of  the 
sources and uses of funds 
 
3.1. Model 1—Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
Since  the  primordial  FHP's  regression  of  investment  on  cash-flow,  controlling  for 
investment opportunities, researchers have used derivate specifications to estimate ICFS. In 
particular, Harhoff (1998) follows Bond et al.(2003) and derives an empirical equation for 
the estimation of ICFS based on an accelerator specification: 
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where       is investment for firm i in period t,        beginning of period   total assets,       
is output growth (measured as sales growth),       is cash-flow,    are time dummies,    
controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity and      is the error term. 
  This  particular  accelerator  specification  has  the  advantageous  feature  of  not 
requiring the computation of Tobin’s Q (the ratio between the total market value and asset 
value of a firm). We refrain from using this measure for two different reasons. The first is 
due to the fact that we would only be able to calculate it for a relatively small subsample of 
firms (only those that are publicly traded), thus losing significant information, in particular, 
observations of smaller and younger firms. Consequently, we would obtain a biased sample 
with respect to financial constraints, not only because it is generally agreed that smaller and 
younger firms face severer constraints—only a few are publicly traded—, but also due to 
the fact that information on publicly traded firms is legally required and so, information 
asymmetry problems are diluted for such firms, potentially reducing financing problems. 
The second reason is more of a theoretical one. Firstly, marginal Q is unobservable, so 
researchers use average Q as an approximation—see Hyashi, 1981, for the derivation of 
average  Q.  Secondly,  the  introduction  of  Q  directly  into  the  estimation  of  investment 
models  for  the  purpose  of  analysing  financial  constraints  may  cause  the  estimated 
sensitivities to cash-flows to be overestimated as they might contain information about 
investment  opportunities  that  were  not  captured  by  Q—Alti,  2003,  in  a  model  where 
financial frictions are absent, shows that, even after Q correction, firms exhibit sensitivities 
to cash-flow. As a result, using Q as a proxy, is not enough to control for investment 
opportunities and so, inferences about cash- flow sensitivities will be biased. 
  For the estimation of this model we resort to the Arellano-Bond first differences 
estimator  that  allows  us  to  eliminate  firm  specific  effects,  takes  into  account 
heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation,  while  allowing  for  the  presence  of  endogenous 10 
 
variables. As a result, suitable instruments have to be devised. We use the twice and further 
lagged values of the right handside variables in the equation (until a maximum of 4 lags), 
two-digit industry indicators (CAE.Rev 2.1), variation interest paid, age, size, a dummy for 
firms that invest in R&D, exports and imports—see Arellano and Bond, 1991, for a detailed 
discussion of the estimator and Rodman, 2009, for STATA implementation. 
 
3.2. Model 2—Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
Almeida et al. (2004) construct an alternative model of liquidity demand and derive an 
empirical equation to estimate the sensitivity of cash to cash-flows. In a few words, the 
model is based on constrained versus unconstrained firms’ cash management. If a firm is 
constrained—its  internal  funds  are  insufficient  to  finance  all  positive  net  present  value 
projects—it has to pass up some investments in the current period in order to be able to 
finance  potentially  better  projects  in  the  future.  By  being  forced  to  manage  liquidity, 
constrained firms will save cash out of cash-flows, while no systematic relationship should 
be found for unconstrained firms. The financial nature of the cash stock variable is a shield 
against missmeasurements in Q (sales growth in our case) and investment opportunities 
hidden in cash-flow because it is not expected that firms will increase their cash stocks if 
cash-flow  signals  a  new/better  investment  opportunity,  unless  they  are  financially 
constrained. As a result, we have the following empirical specification: 
                                                                                     (2) 
where        is the variation in cash stocks,      is a control for firm size (log of total 
assets),           is  the  variation  of  noncash  net  working  capital,              is  the 
variation of short term-debt and      the error term. For the very same reasons stated above, 
we shall use sales growth (     ) instead of Q as a proxy for investment opportunities. 11 
 
  However, we will implement a slight modification to the model. In the spirit of Lin 
(2007), we substitute the variation of short term-debt by the sum of net debt and equity 
issuances (      ) and interest rate variation (       ). The former modification is due to the 
fact that debt and equity issuances, while being a signal of easier access to external funds, 
might have a significant impact upon cash stocks (by accounting procedures), so we control 
for such effect. With respect to the latter, firms may decide to reduce their borrowings or 
pay back debt according to expected interest expenses. However, instead of benchmark 
interest rates variations, we use variations of interest paid, which allows for firm variation 
and thus can also be seen as a form of credit rating. In both specifications, all variables are 
scaled by total assets. The augmented empirical equation is as follows: 
                                                                         
                                                                                                                                         .  (3) 
  The  financial  and  investment  covariates  are  endogenous,  so  there  is  a  need  to 
estimate the model using instrumental variables (2-Step GMM) along with fixed effects to 
take account of unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and panel-robust standard errors. The 
set  of  instruments  includes  twice  lagged  cash  flow,  twice  lagged  sales  growth,  lagged 
investment, lagged variation of noncash net working capital, two-digit industry indicators 
(for overall samples), size (measured as number of employees), lagged bond issuance and 
lagged variation in interest payments. 
 
3.3 Classification Schemes 
For the purpose of comparing both ICFS and CCFS across different groups of firms, we 
perform an a priori classification of firms by their ―degree" of financial distress. For this 
purpose we create subsamples by the following firm characteristics that are either generally 
agreed to or believed to proxy for financial constraints: size, age (and both, SA index) and 12 
 
dividend payment (see Carreira and Silva, 2009). However, we refrain from using financial 
variables to sort firms and focus on relatively exogenous variables in order not to incur in 
regression problems resulting from the simultaneous presence of a variable in the estimated 
equation and classification scheme. Still, for the case of CCFS estimation, this simultaneity 
might be present due to the high correlation between S and SIZE, though we take the 
appropriate precautions in order to provide robust results. Finally, the reason to include 
dividend  policy  as  a  sorting  variable  draws  from  the  fact  that  it  is  by  large  the  most 
common classification scheme used since the seminal work of FHP. 
  Firm Size. It is reasonable to expect that smaller firms face more severe financial 
constraints since such firms do not have the reach or visibility that larger firms have, so 
investors have difficulties in screening the quality of projects. As a result, smaller firms 
tend to be more credit rationed (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995). As an example, if a firm is 
large enough to be quoted, information with respect to this firm will be widely available. 
We measure firm size as number of employees instead of either sales or assets, since in our 
view it is a much ―more exogenous‖ variable. Accordingly, we create an indicator variable 
DIM  that  takes  values  between  1  and  4.  The  partitions  were  set  at  50,  100  and  250 
employees. These thresholds result from an adjustment of the European Commission firm 
size classification to the specificity of our dataset.
1 First, since the information reported by 
firms with less than 20 employees is not reliable, we consider that, for the purpose of this 
paper, small firms have between 20 -49 employees. Second, the threshold 100 employees 
(in line with OECD standards) allows to distinguish, within the 50-250 heterogeneous class, 
medium-small  from  medium -large  firms.  Additionally,  it  deals  with  possible 
representativeness problems associated with the fact that, in our dataset, firms with less 
                                                            
1 European Commission sets upper thresholds at 10, 50 and 250 employees for micro, small and 
medium enterprises, respectively. 13 
 
than 100 employees are drawn randomly, while for firms with more than 100 employees 
the universe is represented. Finally, we have considered setting the last threshold at 500 
employees (OECD benchmark), but this would be of no interest since there are only a few 
firms  that  would  enter  this  upper  category  in  Portugal.  Finally,  note  that  this  sample 
partition is quite problematic as it is done directly using the variable SIZE (employees) 
which is highly correlated with the covariate S (total assets) in the CCFS regression. 
  Firm Age. If a firm has just been created, not much information is available to 
potential investors. Over time, firms tend to build relationships with creditors, banks and 
investors in general, allowing them to obtain external funds in an easier manner as lenders 
gain some insight in both firms’ characteristics and quality. As a result, one should expect 
that  younger  firms  face  more  severe  financial  constraints.  Accordingly  we  create  an 
indicator variable AGEq that takes the values 1, 2, and 3 if a firm is under 10, 10-40, and 
over 40 years old, respectively. The first threshold allows to accommodate the dynamics of 
entry and exit observed at early years (see for e.g. Bellone et al., 2008 for the intensity of 
the selection process, or Coad, 2010 for departures from an exponential distribution of age), 
thus distinguishing young from mature firms. However, a possible relative inertia of older 
firms (Hannan, 2005) or even a change in firm objectives, led us to define an upper class of 
old firms.
2 Still, different specifications were tested in order to provide robust results. 
  The SA index. The previous two variables (size and age) seem particularly appealing 
since they are somewhat ―more exogenous‖ than other variables. In fact, in a recent work, 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) develop an index of constraints based on these two proxies. The 
index is constructed as follows: 
                                                    (4) 
                                                            
2 Coad (2010) argues that old firms are older than expected by the exponential benchmark possibly 
due to a shift from a profit-maximization behaviour to a risk-averse policy of long lasting survival. 14 
 
where, Size is firm’s size measured as log of inflation-adjusted assets and Age is the number 
of years with stock price listed on their Compustat database. However, we will measure 
Age by the number of years in activity in order to avoid sample selection bias (firms that are 
publicly traded face lower constraints). Hadlock and Pierce (2010) report a flattening of the 
relation above the 95th percentile and cap those observations. We opt to winsorize them at 
the top 5% in order to get an approximation to their measure while not losing too much 
information.
3 Note that they use quoted firms which are usually larger/older . Finally we 
split the sample according to terciles , as suggested, classifying the top (bottom) firms as 
financially constrained (unconstrained). However, one must bear in mind that this index  is 
constructed upon a variable S that is a covariate in the CCFS regression. 
  Dividend policy. We will also resort to the primordial classification scheme in FHP 
based on dividend payment since, despite arguable, firms that pay dividends are expected 
not to be constrained. Thus, we compute dummies that equal 1 if a firm has pays dividends 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
4. Data 
The dataset used in this work was constructed from the combination of both Inquérito às 
Empresas Harmonizado (IEH), an annual business survey conducted by the Portuguese 
Statistical Office (INE), and Ficheiro de Unidades Estatísticas (FUE), also collected by 
INE. The former dataset comprises detailed information on firms' balance sheets. On the 
other  hand,  resorting  to  FUE,  that  contains  information  about  firm’s  generic 
characteristics—including size, age and main sector of activity (CAE-Rev. 2.1)—, allows 
                                                            
3 We tested the construction of the index with capped variables above the 95th centile but results do 
not differ significantly. See section 5.3 for these results. 15 
 
to  track  firms  trough  time,  thus  constructing  a  large  unbalanced  panel  of  firms.
4  This 
dataset  comprises  the  universe  of  firms  operating  in  Portugal  with  more  than  100 
employees and a random sample of firms wi th less than 100 employees. The  sample is 
representative of the Portuguese sector disaggregation. 
  For the purpose of this paper the following cleaning procedures were necessary. 
First, we eliminated firms with less than 20 employees due to the lack  of  quality of 
information reported by such firms. Second, we focus only on the industry and part of the 
services sector, thus eliminating the agricultural (also includes husbandry, forestry, fishing, 
inter alia) and financial sectors (inclusion of this sector would naturally bias the estimation 
favouring  unconstrained  firms).  Observations  that  were  reported  either  missing  or  with 
unreasonable values were dropped. In some specific circumstances, unreasonable values 
suffered  a  treatment in  order  to  achieve  coherent  values.
5  As a result we have  a large 
unbalanced  panel  of  22.651  firms  for  the  period  1996 -2004  resulting  in  86.455 
observations. 
  The  advantage  of  using  this  dataset  is  that  it  comprises  detailed  financial 
information from firm's balance sheets thus providing some insight on their status regarding 
financial constraints. In particular, it allows us to develop a classification scheme that 
groups firms into different levels of financial constraints.  Additionally, resorting to FUE 
allows us to construct an unique and comprehensive dataset covering the universe of firms 
operating in Portugal with more than 100 employees and a large  representative sample of 
Portuguese firms with more than 20 employees. Furthermore, the dataset comprises a broad 
                                                            
4 These two data sources were matched using a code number, also provided by INE that uniquely 
identifies each firm for different surveys along the successive years. 
5 These cases include specific observations whose correct values were possible to obtain from other 
variables or resulting from changes in signal mistyping errors. 16 
 
range of industries. Finally, the large sample period (1996-2004) is adequate to take into 
account macroeconomic cyclical variations. 
  However, a major pitfall of this dataset is the inexistence of market information 
about the firms, since we only have access to a code number of each firm, thus not being 
able to match the dataset with information from, for example, stock markets. Still, only a 
few firms in Portugal are publicly traded and so the benefits of such extension of the dataset 
would be negligible. Additionally, information of firms is limited to a relatively low level 
of disaggregation of balance sheets. Finally, by dropping from the database all firms with 
less than 20 employees, we are cutting off a large number of observations, even though 
they would lack in quality and would further increase the unbalancedness of the panel. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the selected variables, used in the estimation of Model 
(1),  for  the  global  sample  and  by  classification  scheme  subsamples.  Both  means  and 
standard deviations are reported. An interesting pattern that can be observed is that mean 
investment decreases with firm age. In other words, older firms tend to invest less than 
younger firms. A symptom of financial constraints might emerge from the comparison of 
firm's dividend policy, since firms that pay dividends have, on average, lower cash-flows 
than firms that do not pay dividends and so, the former are possibly retaining less funds 
than the latter. Furthermore, smaller firms exhibit lower output growth while younger firms' 
output  growth  is  larger  than  older  firms.  Table  2  reports  the  same  statistics  for  the 
estimation of Model (2). In addition to the patterns previously discerned, younger firms, on 
average, have larger cash-flows and issue more debt and equity (the latter due to short-term 
debt issuances as expected). 17 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of Model (1) variables 
Variables 
Total  Size classes  Age classes  SA index  Dividend payment 
[20;50[  [50;100[  [100;250[  [250;+ [  [0;10[  [10;40[  [40;+ [  1
st tercile  2
nd terciles  3
rd tercile  No  Yes 
             0.0750  0.0731  0.0743  0.0740  0.0726  0.0940  0.0735  0.0705  0.0721  0.0730  0.0722  0.0810  0.0732 
  (0.108)  (0.114)  (0.107)  (0.100)  (0.095)  (0.136)  (0.104)  (0.107)  (0.111)  (0.098)  (0.101)  (0.106)  (0.118) 
                           
               0.0867  0.0826  0.0865  0.0877  0.0900  0.1052  0.0858  0.0797  0.0798  0.0851  0.0894  0.0985  0.0817 
  (0.119)  (0.124)  (0.118)  (0.111)  (0.112)  (0.141)  (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.117)  (0.113)  (0.120)  (0.121)  (0.124) 
                           
       0.0410  0.0237  0.0355  0.0372  0.0775  0.0864  0.0357  0.0283  0.0134  0.0368  0.0601  0.0512  0.0409 
  (0.280)  (0.297)  (0.260)  (0.258)  (0.259)  (0.374)  (0.274)  (0.231)  (0.284)  (0.282)  (0.255)  (0.258)  (0.309) 
                           
         0.0627  0.0436  0.0616  0.0621  0.1081  0.1269  0.0581  0.0439  0.0282  0.0593  0.0839  0.0983  0.0527 
  (0.285)  (0.302)  (0.275)  (0.262)  (0.279)  (0.367)  (0.280)  (0.234)  (0.295)  (0.291)  (0.263)  (0.249)  (0.321) 
                           
              0.0947  0.0914  0.0952  0.0945  0.1015  0.1088  0.0948  0.0835  0.0835  0.0969  0.0985  0.1085  0.0719 
  (0.094)  (0.096)  (0.089)  (0.090)  (0.095)  (0.116)  (0.089)  (0.093)  (0.103)  (0.086)  (0.090)  (0.078)  (0.122) 
                           
                0.1020  0.0995  0.1026  0.1029  0.1078  0.1140  0.1031  0.0897  0.0912  0.1055  0.1049  0.1211  0.0715 
  (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.089)  (0.090)  (0.097)  (0.112)  (0.090)  (0.091)  (0.100)  (0.087)  (0.091)  (0.076)  (0.121) 
                           
Observations  18,359  5,206  4,382  4,831  2,402  1,611  12,830  3,212  4,434  5,088  7,278  7,483  4,562 
Number of firms  6,242  2,308  1,726  1,597  751  854  4,481  1,158  1,709  2,056  2,443  3,423  2,399 
Notes: Both total sample and subsamples’ mean values of the main variables used to estimate equation (1) are reported. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of Model (2) variables 
Variables 
Total  Size classes  Age classes  SA index  Dividend payment 
[20;50[  [50;100[  [100;250[  [250;+ [  [0;10[  [10;40[  [40;+ [  1
st tercile  2
nd terciles  3
rd tercile  No  Yes 
        0.0025  0.0026  0.0019  0.0018  0.0037  0.0049  0.0020  0.0031  0.0021  0.0021  0.0032  0.0009  0.0038 
  (0.062)  (0.069)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.062)  (0.074)  (0.062)  (0.056)  (0.069)  (0.058)  (0.055)  (0.062)  (0.063) 
                           
       0.0850  0.0841  0.0857  0.0854  0.0911  0.0954  0.0858  0.0769  0.0740  0.0884  0.0888  0.0996  0.0631 
  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.082)  (0.085)  (0.089)  (0.106)  (0.086)  (0.088)  (0.103)  (0.080)  (0.082)  (0.069)  (0.124) 
                           
       0.0368  0.0244  0.0276  0.0288  0.0672  0.0873  0.0338  0.0232  0.0128  0.0353  0.0534  0.0517  0.0375 
  (0.288)  (0.302)  (0.263)  (0.256)  (0.255)  (0.379)  (0.286)  (0.237)  (0.297)  (0.280)  (0.258)  (0.255)  (0.318) 
                           
      15.5388  14.5668  15.4039  15.9403  17.3994  15.5210  15.4890  15.7404  14.3135  15.2460  16.6363  15.6070  15.3988 
  (1.448)  (1.112)  (0.972)  (1.132)  (1.523)  (1.804)  (1.371)  (1.520)  (1.082)  (1.029)  (1.170)  (1.368)  (1.694) 
                           
      0.0629  0.0614  0.0607  0.0626  0.0601  0.0760  0.0621  0.0593  0.0631  0.0621  0.0589  0.0695  0.0623 
  (0.081)  (0.085)  (0.078)  (0.076)  (0.070)  (0.097)  (0.079)  (0.080)  (0.086)  (0.075)  (0.073)  (0.081)  (0.087) 
                           
         -0.0478  -0.0411  -0.0460  -0.0520  -0.0518  -0.0558  -0.0460  -0.0505  -0.0541  -0.0429  -0.0432  -0.0448  -0.0591 
  (0.166)  (0.177)  (0.154)  (0.156)  (0.149)  (0.200)  (0.164)  (0.154)  (0.184)  (0.157)  (0.149)  (0.148)  (0.213) 
                           
        0.0349  0.0311  0.0326  0.0284  0.0381  0.0386  0.0355  0.0308  0.0361  0.0376  0.0343  0.0429  0.0301 
  (0.209)  (0.215)  (0.201)  (0.204)  (0.196)  (0.252)  (0.208)  (0.191)  (0.202)  (0.184)  (0.209)  (0.191)  (0.254) 
                           
         -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0009 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010) 
                           
Observations  17,283  5,032  3,569  4,045  2,020  1,602  12,459  3,222  3,981  4,313  6,576  5,417  3,533 
Number of firms  4,771  1,396  1,022  1,109  562  468  3,475  898  1,099  1,220  1,830  1,559  957 
Notes: Both total sample and subsamples’ mean values of the main variables used to estimate equation (2) are reported. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. 
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  Tables 3 and 4 present the correlations and its significance levels across the main 
variables used for the ICFS and CCFS estimations, respectively. It is possible to observe 
that  correlations  are  significant  for  most  variables  used  in  both  Model  (1)  and  (2). 
Exceptions are the small and non-significant correlations between cash stock variation and 
both size (total assets) and variation of interest paid for Model (2). Still for the same model, 
negative correlations between cash stock variation and both investment and non-cash net 
working capital are as expected as they are demands and not sources of cash. Finally, the 
correlation between cash-flow and debt and equity issuances is negative possibly indicating 
that either when there is a shortage in internal funds, firms resort to issuances or, on the 
contrary, when firms have large cash flows they use them to reduce debt. 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix of Model (1) variables 
VARIABLES                                                                           
              1.00           
               0.30***   1.00         
       0.12***  0.10***   1.00       
         0.08***  0.11***  0.16***  1.00     
              0.27***  0.19***  0.28***  0.18***   1.00   
                0.22***  0.28***  0.10***  0.25***  0.67***  1.00 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix of Model (2) variables 
VARIABLES                                                             
          1.00               
       0.10***    1.00             
       0.12***  0.24***    1.00           
        0.00  -0.02***  0.04***    1.00         
      -0.05***  0.19***  0.09***  -0.09***    1.00       
         -0.23***  0.11***  -0.01**  0.04***  -0.26***     1.00     
        0.14***  -0.12***  0.20***  0.05***  0.24***     0.00    1.00   
         0.00  -0.04***  0.13***  0.02***  0.09***  -0.05***  0.19***  1.00 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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5.2. Overall sample estimation 
The regression of Model (1) reports an extremely high sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow  (0.3195),  significant  at  the  5%  level,  as  it  is  shown  in  Table  5.  This  means  that 
Portuguese firms, on average, increase their investment in 32 cents for each euro of extra 
cash flow, illustrative of the financial distress faced by such firms. We test for the overall 
significance of the regression obtaining a highly significant Wald test statistic (309.7). A 
Hansen test, which does not reject the orthogonality of instruments, is also performed. 
 
Table 5: Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation 
Variables  Coefficient 
                         0.1388*** 
  (9.084) 
              0.0633** 
  (2.316) 
           -0.0009 
  (-0.204) 
                     0.3195** 
  (2.382) 
                  0.0805 
  (1.490) 
Year dummies  Yes 
   
Observations  18,359 
Number of firms    6,242 
Hansen chi2 p-value    0.395 
Wald Chi2  309.7 
Notes: Regression of model (1). Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Further test statistics available from the authors on request. 
 
  Meanwhile, as expected, the regression of Model (2) reports positive and significant 
sensitivities  of  cash  to  cash-flow  confirming  that,  in  general,  Portuguese  firms  face 
financial constraints. As it is shown in  Table 6, coefficients reported on cash flow are 
significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%  level  for  the  total  sample.  The  reported  R-
squared (0.176) is within the usual in these models, while the Hansen test does not reject 21 
 
the null of orthogonal instruments. The estimated CCFS is 0.1817, meaning that Portuguese 
firms, on average, save 18 cents out of each euro of cash flow which is symptomatic of the 
presence of severe financial constraints. 
 
Table 6: Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation 
Variables  Coefficient 
                  0.1817*** 
  (10.678) 
                0.0142*** 
  (4.983) 
               0.0135*** 
  (3.603) 
                 -0.2157*** 
  (-18.691) 
                    -0.1478*** 
  (-23.760) 
                   0.0783*** 
  (18.429) 
                  -0.3322*** 
  (-3.759) 
   
Observations  15,277 
Number of firms    4,771 
Hansen chi2 p-value    0.435 
R-squared    0.176 
Notes: Regression of model (2). Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Further test statistics available from the authors on request. 
 
  Note  that  quite  high  coefficients  on  cash-flow  may  arise  from  three  different 
reasons.  First,  the  equation  (3)  used  to  estimate  Model  (2)  is  somewhat  close  to  an 
accounting identity so sensitivities might be overestimated. Second, for both Models, due to 
the relative underdevelopment of Portuguese financial markets, one would expect that firms 
operating in Portugal would face severe financial constraints. Finally, sales growth might 
not be capturing investment opportunities, since its use as a proxy is questionable. As a 
result, especially for Model (1), coefficients on cash-flow are possibly overestimated. 22 
 
 
5.3. Classification schemes 
Size. Both estimates used to measure financial constraints provide evidence that there is an 
inverse  relationship  between  firm  size  and  financial  constraints.  With  respect  to  ICFS 
analysis, as it is shown in Table 7, those seem to affect only the smallest firms (with less 
than 50 employees), that invest 37 cents out of an extra euro of cash flow (significant at the 
10% level). On the other hand, the estimates on ICFS for larger firms are not statistically 
different from zero, indicating that such firms do not suffer from financial distress.  
 
Table 7: Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation by firm size classes 
Variables 
Size classes 
[20;50[  [50;100[  [100;250[  [250;+ [ 
                       0.1261***          0.1432***          0.1018***          0.0872*** 
  (3.951)  (4.968)  (4.050)  (2.625) 
         -0.0047    0.0018    0.0280    0.0218 
  (-0.304)  (0.077)  (1.140)  (0.712) 
           0.0022    -0.0080    0.0043    0.0105 
  (0.331)  (-1.172)  (0.642)  (0.939) 
                   0.3738*    0.0332    -0.0463    0.2419 
  (1.873)  (0.184)  (-0.238)  (1.162) 
                  -0.0156    0.1144        0.2324**    0.0433 
  (-0.200)  (1.397)  (2.481)  (0.349) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Observations  4,998  3,923  4,483  2,232 
Number of firms  2,206  1,549  1,471  709 
Hansen chi2 p-value  0.028  0.934  0.013  0.908 
Wald Chi2  27.99  84.61  74.39  156.0 
Notes: Regression of model (1) for size subsamples. Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available from 
the authors on request. 
 
  As to CCFS analysis (Table 8), besides reporting a descending trend, coefficients on 
cash-flow for the subsamples of firms with less than 50 employees, between 50 and 100 
employees and between 100 and 250 employees (0.2876, 0.2025 and 0.0977, respectively) 23 
 
are all significant at the 1% level. Still, for very large firms (≥250 employees), the reported 
coefficient on cash-flow (0.1034) is only statistically significant at the 5%. This indicates 
that  we  might  be  in  presence  of  a  negative  relationship  between  size  and  financial 
constraints.  Note  that  there  is  a  potential  bias  caused  by  the  correlation  between  DIM 
(classes  of  firms  by  employees)  and  the  covariate  S  (log  total  assets).  We  tested  an 
alternative regression excluding S but the results do not differ significantly.
6 
 
Table 8: Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation by firm size classes 
Variables 
Size classes 
[20;50[  [50;100[  [100;250[  [250;+ [ 
               0.2876***          0.2025***          0.0977***          0.1034** 
  (7.119)  (5.042)  (3.150)  (2.557) 
              0.0119**         0.0138**         0.0171***    -0.0038 
  (2.066)  (2.060)  (2.862)  (-0.526) 
        0.0056    0.0071    0.0073         0.0198** 
  (0.562)  (0.904)  (1.043)  (2.339) 
                 -0.2540***           -0.1991***           -0.1841***          -0.2099*** 
  (-10.151)  (-8.208)  (-8.505)  (-5.924) 
                    -0.1754***          -0.1369***           -0.1391***           -0.1588*** 
  (-14.247)  (-9.405)  (-10.907)  (-8.014) 
                   0.1117***           0.0776***           0.0562***          0.0696*** 
  (12.110)  (7.640)  (7.163)  (6.296) 
                  -0.4581***    -0.1242          -0.5055***       -0.5447* 
  (-2.635)  (-0.682)  (-3.252)  (-1.927) 
         
Observations  3,901  2,970  3,621  1,845 
R-squared  1,396  1,022  1,109     562 
Number of firms  0.234  0.174  0.150  0.163 
Hansen chi2 p-value  0.427  0.138  0.239  0.568 
Notes: Regression of model (2) for size subsamples. Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available from 
the authors on request. 
 
                                                            
6 With respect to the CCFS estimates, these are slightly lower (0.1515) for the second size group 
and slightly higher (0.1091) for the third group. The same coefficient for the top and bottom groups 
remains  unchanged,  as  do  so  significance  levels  for  all  groupings.  Further  results  on  these 
regressions are available from authors on request. 24 
 
  Age. With respect to age, we do not find a clear pattern that links age to financial 
constraints. Whilst the estimates on ICFS by age groups renders us a puzzle, since we 
would not expect higher sensitivities for older firms, as we can see in Table 9. Additionally, 
very old firms' investment seems not to react neither to investment opportunities, nor to 
previous investment, which adds to the argument that possibly these firms are either "inert" 
or have different objectives. On the other hand, the results for Model (2) regression exhibit 
a clear inverse relationship between age and constraints, as one can observe in Table 10. 
While  for  the  oldest  firms,  cash-flow  appears  to  have  a  small  impact  on  cash  stocks 
(estimated coefficient is 0.0957 and significant at the 5% level), the opposite is true for 
young and mature firms, that save 28 and 19 cents out of every euro of extra cash-flow, 
respectively (both statistically significant at 1% level). 
 
Table 9: Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation by age classes 
Variables 
Age classes 
[0;10[  [10;40[  [40;+ [ 
                        0.1698***           0.1456***    0.0547 
  (2.717)  (7.665)  (1.471) 
              0.0786**      0.0489*    0.0305 
  (1.967)  (1.859)  (0.734) 
           0.0085    -0.0067    -0.0034 
  (0.540)  (-1.323)  (-0.320) 
                0.2474         0.4398**           0.5021*** 
  (1.396)  (2.352)  (2.772) 
                  0.0058    0.0828       0.1632* 
  (0.052)  (1.202)  (1.803) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  1,611  12,830  3,212 
Number of firms     854  4,481  1,158 
Hansen chi2 p-value  0.058  0.024  0.275 
Wald Chi2  44.71  228.9  26.70 
Notes: Regression of model (1) for age subsamples. Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available from 




Table 10: Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation by age classes 
Variables 
Age classes 
[0;10[  [10;40[  [40;+ [ 
               0.2759***          0.1876***          0.0957** 
  (0.079)  (0.020)  (0.038) 
         0.0185          0.0121***          0.0255*** 
  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
        0.0175          0.0130***    0.0089 
  (0.017)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
              -0.1799***         -0.2337***          -0.1535*** 
  (0.043)  (0.014)  (0.024) 
                 -0.1368***         -0.1578***          -0.1071*** 
  (0.022)  (0.007)  (0.015) 
                0.0634***          0.0819***          0.0693*** 
  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
          -0.1939         -0.3172***   -0.2152 
  (0.374)  (0.102)  (0.201) 
       
Observations  1,119  10,910  2,796 
Number of firms     468    3,475     898 
R-squared  0.644    0.324  0.519 
Hansen chi2 p-value  0.170    0.192  0.127 
Notes: Regression of model (2) for age subsamples. Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available from 
the authors on request. 
 
  SA  index.  Our  results  appear  not  to  support  the  findings  of  Hadlock  and  Pierce 
(2010) that present the SA index as way to sort firms by their degree of financial distress. 
With respect to investment demand, only for the bottom tercile of the SA index, do firms 
exhibit a statistically significant sensitivity of investment to cash flow (0.5620), as it is 
reported  in  Table  11.  This  result  is  counter-intuitive,  since  we  would  expect  the  most 
constrained firms (top tercile) to exhibit higher and statistically significant ICFS. The same 
findings are obtained with respect to the framework of demand for liquidity. Albeit all 
grouping regressions report significant estimates (at the 1% level). Estimates on cash-flow 
sensitivities are 0.2346, 0.2236 and 0.0674 respectively for the bottom, middle and top 
terciles, as reported in Table 12. The decreasing coefficients reported are against the use of 
the SA index as a measure of financial constraints, since the results are the exact opposite to 26 
 
the ones expected. Main issues are not altered by capping age and size (total assets) instead 
of winsorizing these variables.
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st tercile  2
nd terciles  3
rd tercile 
                        0.0776***          0.1146***          0.1477*** 
  (2.749)  (4.849)  (6.460) 
         -0.0142    0.0059    0.0105 
  (-0.419)  (0.253)  (0.294) 
           0.0030    0.0051    -0.0054 
  (0.392)  (0.773)  (-0.732) 
                       0.5620***    0.2134    0.2010 
  (3.788)  (1.336)  (0.916) 
                  0.0436    0.0647    0.1353 
  (0.617)  (0.827)  (1.283) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Observations    4,194    4,594  7,067 
Number of firms    1,611    1,852  2,369 
Hansen chi2 p-value    0.214    0.311  0.552 
Wald Chi2  44.38  97.42  229.0 
Notes: Regression of model (1) for SA index subsamples. Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available from 
the authors on request. 
 
  Note that there is a potential bias caused by the inclusion of S (log total assets) in 
both  the  regression  and  classification  scheme.  Still,  we  tested  an  alternative  regression 
excluding S but the results do not differ significantly.
8 Nevertheless, these results may be 
due to  the weight of        in  the index  being overestimated, meaning that  large firms 
actually manage to get into the top tercile (most constrained firms) due to this positive term, 
when in fact they are not financially constrained. In fact, while for the bottom tercile mean 
                                                            
7 Statistics not reported but available from authors on request. 
8 With respect to the CCFS estimates, these are slightly higher (0.2452 , 0.2348 and 0.0715) for the 
bottom, middle and top terciles, respectively. The same significance levels remain unchanged for all 
groupings. Further results on these regressions are available from authors on request. 27 
 
S (SIZE) is 13.90 (56.12), for the top tercile it is 16.32 (229.32)—statistics not reported. 
Therefore, the parameters used in the index calculations appear to be extremely sensitive to 
different economic realities. Finally, the mixed results found for age subsamples, might 
also help to explain the inaccurate classification of constraints by the index. As a result, 
although being very intuitive, care must be taken when using this index. In particular, if 
data on firm self-assessment of constraints is available, which unfortunately is not our case, 
then reestimation of the index coefficients is certainly warranted. 
 




st tercile  2
nd terciles  3
rd tercile 
                0.2346***          0.2236***           0.0674*** 
  (6.965)  (5.931)  (2.638) 
                0.0252***    0.0067    0.0084* 
  (4.456)  (1.109)  (1.737) 
               0.0293***          0.0249***    0.0085 
  (3.172)  (2.715)  (1.592) 
              -0.2401***          -0.2331***            -0.1838*** 
  (-9.339)  (-9.246)  (-10.669) 
                   -0.1617***          -0.1543***            -0.1275*** 
  (-11.217)  (-12.205)  (-12.412) 
                 0.0909***          0.0799***           0.0570*** 
  (9.119)  (8.309)  (9.296) 
                  -0.5017***    -0.2000        -0.3381** 
  (-2.654)  (-1.125)  (-2.363) 
       
Observations  3,320  3,520  5,879 
Number of firms  1,099  1,220  1,830 
R-squared  0.218  0.174  0.128 
Hansen chi2 p-value  0.824  0.331  0.917 
Notes: Regression of model (2) for SA index subsamples. Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available from 
the authors on request. 
 
  Dividend policy. Dividend policy was the main classification scheme primarily used 
to distinguish financially constrained from unconstrained firms. Both estimations confirm 
that  dividend  policy  may  be  used  to  sort  firms  into  financially  constrained  and 28 
 
unconstrained, as it is shown in Tables 13 and 14. First, for Model (1), the pattern is clear 
since firms that pay no dividends appear to invest 97 cents out of every 1 euro of extra 
cash-flow  while  the  same  estimate  for  firms  that  pay  dividends  is  not  statistically 
significant.  Second,  CCFS  are  higher  for  firms  that  pay  no  dividends  (0.2277  against 
0.1278), both statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the differences in ICFS are 
substantially  larger  than  those  of  CCFS,  possibly  indicating  that  financial  constraints 
measured through the former might be overestimated. It may be possible to argue that using 
ICFS might drive researchers to report firms as financially constrained more often, or at a 
larger degree than it should be expected. 
 
Table 13: Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation by dividend policy 
Variables 
Dividend payment 
No  Yes 
                       0.1654***          0.1484*** 
  (6.089)  (4.340) 
         0.0619    -0.0352 
  (1.449)  (-0.895) 
           -0.0050    0.0163 
  (-0.643)  (1.434) 
                      0.9711***    0.1525 
  (3.059)  (1.182) 
                  -0.1712    0.0001 
  (-1.097)  (0.001) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
     
Observations  6,673  3,523 
Number of firms  3,038  1,754 
Hansen chi2 p-value  0.367  0.451 
Wald Chi2  101.0  42.93 
Notes: Regression of model (1) for dividend policy subsamples. Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available 
from the authors on request. 
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Table 14: Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation by dividend policy 
Variables 
Dividend payment 
No  Yes 
                0.2277***           0.1278*** 
  (4.833)  (3.930) 
                0.0157***    0.0106 
  (2.603)  (1.312) 
          0.0182*    0.0032 
  (1.932)  (0.301) 
              -0.2989***           -0.1423*** 
  (-11.876)  (-4.986) 
                 -0.1791***           -0.0922*** 
  (-13.163)  (-7.861) 
                0.1181***           0.0604*** 
  (12.652)  (6.805) 
           -0.2528      -0.3364* 
  (-1.414)  (-1.755) 
     
Observations  3,834  2,543 
Number of firms  1,559     957 
R-squared  0.240  0.125 
Hansen chi2 p-value  0.733  0.693 
Notes: Regression of model (2) for dividend policy subsamples Robust z-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available 
from the authors on request. 
 
  Overall, firms appear to be extremely financially constrained in Portugal, which 
might  be  due  to  relative  underdevelopment  of  financial  markets.  However,  despite  the 
problems, described above, associated with the estimation of ICFS and the fact that the 
CCFS test may be relatively close to an accounting identity, some patters rose from the data 
indicating a potential inverse relationship between size, dividend policy, the SA index and 
financial constraints. As to age, the results are mixed and should be dealt with caution in 
order to ascertain if they originate from problems associated with the estimations, flawed 
classification schemes, or even erroneous theoretical assumptions. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
In  this  paper  we  have  analysed  the  financial  constraints  faced  by  firms  by  estimating 
investment-cash flow sensitivities and cash-cash flow sensitivities upon a large unbalanced 
panel  of  Portuguese  firms.  Additionally  we  split  our  sample  according  to  firm's 
characteristics that are believed to be good proxies for financial constraints (size, age and 
dividend policy) as well as resorting to a new index of constraints (SA index) in order to 
both  test  the  validity  of  such  classification  schemes  and  compare  measurement 
methodologies. 
  Our results, while supporting previous literature on the inverse relationship between 
size, dividend policy and financial constraints, they cast some doubts on previously devised 
relationships between age and the level of constraints. As to the SA index, it is clear that 
the  model should  be  calibrated  according  to  each  economic  reality  in order  to  provide 
correct constraints classification. 
  This work adds to the discussion over financial constraints both by providing new 
results  on  the  Portuguese  (and  perhaps  also  European)  economy  and  by  testing  and 
comparing different methodologies used to measure constraints and classify firms by their 
financial distress. 
  Finally,  this  paper  reveals  serious  difficulties  of  firms  in  resorting  to  external 
finance. So, despite a need for particular analysis of such measures, policies should be 
taken  to  alleviate  firm's  financial  constraints,  in  particular,  those  aimed  at  firms  with 
smaller size. These policies should be discriminative and specially devised for firms with 
favourable growth prospects but financially constrained.  
  Future research should aim essentially at five goals: (a) develop more consistent 
measures of financial constraints; (b) analyse entry using a pool of potential entrants and 
controlling for selection biases; (c) analyse exit distinguishing different modes exiting the 31 
 
market; (d) explore suitable policies to alleviate financial constraints; (e) analyse financial 
constraints in different sectors of economic activity.   32 
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Appendix: Construction of variables 
From the data at our disposal we were able to create the following variables: 
Size (SIZE): Measured as the number of employees 
Size (S): Computed as log inflation-adjusted assets (deflation through the GDP deflator) 
Age  (AGE):  Computed  as  the  difference  between  the  current  year  and  the  year  of 
establishment of the firm plus one 
Investment  (I  |  invest):  Measured  as  additions  to  plant,  property  and  equipment-  gross 
investment 
Output (Y | y): Measured as total sales and services 
Cash- flow (CF | cf): Computed as net income before taxes plus depreciation  
Cash stock (CS | cs): Measured as total cash holdings 
Investment Opportunities(DY | dy): In most empirical studies, investment opportunities are 
measured using average Tobin's Q (the ratio between the total market value and asset value 
of a firm). However, we refrain from using this measure and instead use sales growth. This 
measure is often used in empirical work on countries with less developed financial markets 
where information on firm's market value is scarcer (see for eg. Budina et al., 2000 or 
Konings et al., 2003). In some cases lagged sales may even outperform Q (see FHP p. 
173,174).  
Dividends  (DIV):  Computed  as  an  indicator  due  to  the  lack  of  quality  in  the  variable 
Reserves. The variable will take value 0 if the firm does not pay dividends and the value 1 
if a firm pays dividends.  
Debt and equity issuances (Issuances): Sum of debt and equity issuances. For the year 2001 
equity issuances are reported as missing. The reason lies in legal changes that took place 
with the introduction of euros (most firms adjusted their equity not necessarily meaning 
issuing equity). 
Non-cash net working capital (NWK | nwk): Difference between non-cash current assets 
and current liabilities. 
  All variables of interest were winsorized at 1% level in order to avoid problems with 
outliers in the estimation procedures. Deflators used include the Industrial Production Price 
Index and Labour Cost Index, both drawn from INE, and the GDP deflator, drawn from the 
Portuguese Central Bank (BdP). Nevertheless, no deflators were used when a variable was 
constructed as a ratio of two nominal values (normalized). In such cases we assume that the 
price growth rates are homogeneous. All variables in low caps result from a normalization 36 
 
procedure (the variable of interest is divided by total assets). Finally, prefixes D_(d_) are 
added for first difference of variables (normalised variables) of interest. 
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